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Christopher Shields 
APA Abstract, 1997
Ουσία in Metaphysics vii and viii: a Syntactic Study
Aristotle m oves indifferently between syntactically differentiable uses 
of 'ουσία' throughout Metaphysics vii and viii: (i) one is free-standing, where 
'ουσία is used as a substantive, and readily admits of a plural, 'ουσίαι; (ii) the 
other is dependent upon an accompanying genitive for its completion, and 
admits of a plural only in a parasitic way. It is often thought that his ease of 
movement between these two uses implicates Aristotle in a kind of 
confusion, or indeed, in several kinds of confusion. The questions:
(1) What is the ουσία of x? 
and
(2) What is ουσία?
ought to receive different kinds of answers. Taken extensionally, answers to 
(1) ought to carve out a class of essences, where non-substances no less than 
substances might be thought to have essences; taken in the same way, 
answers to (2) should present a list of the successful candidates for 
substantiality, where, trivially, nothing in any non-substance category merits 
a mention. Similarly, taken intensionally, answers to (1) should specify the 
nature of the ουσία of some thing or things, where this will turn out to be the 
essence of those things, with no immediate restriction on the range of 
potential essence bearers (e.g. Socrates is essentially a human being; blue is 
essentially a color); taken in this way, though, answers to (2) should specify 
the nature or essence only of those things which qualify as members of a 
restricted class of entities, those in the category of substance, which includes 
Socrates but not blueness.
Scholars have wanted to connect the answers to these questions in a 
variety of different ways. More to the point, Aristotle himself evidently 
connects the dependent and free-standing uses of 'ουσία in striking ways, in 
both Metaphysics vii 6 and 17. The cogency of his doing so depends in part 
upon how  these distinct uses are conceived by him. By the same token, the 
various scholarly proposals about their connection are best assessed against 
the backdrop of a fairly neutral survey of the linguistic data of Aristotle’s 
most concentrated inquiry into ουσία, the middle books of the Metaphysics.
A full text version will be posted on my web-site, after 15 December. 
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